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Introduction
The huge cultural and economic differences among its regions despite 150 years of common political and legal institutions have made Italy one of the most frequented laboratory in economics. In 2008 indeed Southern Italy displayed a 12 percent lower share of respectful people and a 40 percent lower income per capita than Northern Italy (Iuzzolino et al., 2011) .
1
A well-known literature has traced back this gap to the diverse political trajectories of these regions during the Middle Ages (Putnam et al., 1993) . In particular, the experience of a more inclusive political system-i.e., the communes-would have helped Northern Italy develop a stronger culture of cooperation easing property rights protection, contract enforcement, and the functioning of formal institutions (Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2014 ). Yet, recent papers have raised several doubts on this slant.
2 First, Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) show that the main driver of present-day culture in Europe is the need of sharing climate-driven consumption risk during the Middle Ages rather than past political institutions, and that up to the 17th century the two parts of Italy did not display significant differences. Second, a growing body of research reveals that, in the aftermath of the Unification, the two blocks fared similarly well in terms of development (Pescosolido, 2011; Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2013) . Building on these contributions, we document that the opening of the present-day gap in culture and economic outcomes is the consequence of the region-specific tax policies selected between 1861 and 1911 by the elite of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which annexed the rest of Italy in 1861. These policies discriminated more the regions farther away from the Northern frontiers and so less politically salient for the unified government.
These patterns are consistent with a two-region, two-social class model that we construct to inform our empirical test. Formally, we consider a simple and yet general society split in two mass one citizenries, each living in a region and consuming a private and a public good.
The Northern region represents the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Southern one can be seen as any of the absolutists polities that were annexed at Unification. The production of the private good is in the hands of the citizenry and its technology is linear in a region-specific 1 The first statistics represents the share of answers mentioning "tolerance and respect for other people" as important qualities children should be encouraged to learn to the 2008 European Value Study. 2 Another literature claims that genetic differences are the crucial driver of the North-South imbalances (Lynn, 2010 ). Yet, this odd argument has been proven completely unfounded by Felice and Giugliano (2011) .
efficiency parameter and the citizenry's investment in a culture of cooperation. The citizenry consumes the untaxed supply of private good, whereas a part of the taxed one contributes to the production of the region-specific public good, and the remainder accrues to a mass zero "elite." Under autarky, each regional elite selects a tax rate maximizing the sum of her rents and the welfare of the region's citizenry net of linear tax-collection costs. Since these costs are sizable because of limited state capacity, the equilibrium tax revenues fall with the extent of technological efficiency. Under political union instead, both region-specific tax policies are selected by the Northern elite who bears lower marginal tax-collection costs than under autarky, devotes a share of the Southern tax revenues to public good production lower than that committed by the Southern elite under autarky, and delivers a less useful public good to the Southern population. This set of assumptions is consistent with the fact that the Kingdom of Italy had a state capacity higher than those of the pre-unitary states and was initially politically dominated by the elite of the former Kingdom of Sardinia. This liberal bourgeoisie was mainly interested in getting the Northern industry off the ground.
Thus, extraction is cheaper under political union and escalates with the factors that boost its returns and, in particular, the extent of technological efficiency. Provided that the Southern technology is backward and so the disincentive from taxation is limited, tax revenues in the South under political union are also higher than under autarky and decrease with the South's political relevance for the North, i.e., the share of tax revenues invested by the Northern elite into the production of the Southern public good. Finally, Unification can depress cultural accumulation and welfare in the South since both rise with the marginal tax-collection costs and the South's political relevance, which in turn curb extraction and so investment distortion. The gist of the model survives when we allow the South to specialize in a traditional sector. In this case, the risk of losing rents can discourage extractive policies.
To test these predictions, we study over the 1801-1911 period those regions that were absorbed by the unitary state but were not part of the Kingdom of Sardinia before Unification. We proxy the post-Unification political relevance of each of these regions with the average distance of its pre-Unification main city from the capital of the foreign power most adverse to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Turning to tax policies, we exploit the fact that the Italian economy was essentially agrarian and thus we focus on the revenues from land prop-erty taxes. These hit the profitability from land property and, in particular, the landowner's effort and investment in technology. To capture the efficiency of the farming technologies most widespread at the time, we look at the geographic determinants of the profitability of sericulture and the production of wheat, citrus, and olives. Finally, we gage marginal tax-collection costs with a proxy for fiscal capacity, i.e., military personnel per 1000 citizens. Consistent with our model, pre-Unification tax revenues are mainly explained by the contemporaneous farming productivity but not by the region's political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite, whereas the opposite is true for the post-Unification period.
Moreover, each region's political relevance, the unified state's marginal tax-collection cost, and tax distortions significantly shaped the increasing differences in income per capita, electoral turnout, and human capital between the North and the South over the period in which tax policies remained region-specific, i.e., . We measure tax distortions with the difference between the tax revenues observed in the region and those that would have prevailed without Unification according to our positive taxation model. To determine whether the correlations we document are, in fact, causal, we follow a two-step strategy. First, we control not only for fixed region effects, but also for other relevant observable factors, like wages, income inequality, energy endowment, and population density. Including these controls has little effect on the gist of our results. Second, we use insights from Altonji et al. (2005) to evaluate how much greater the influence of unobservables would need to be, relative to observables, to completely explain away the relationships we uncover in the data. We find that this influence would have to be on average 7 times greater than that of observables.
Hence, it is quite unlikely that our estimates can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity.
Albeit a long literature has related the present-day North-South divide to post-Unification policies (Aprile, 2010) , no other work has built and tested a model clarifying how these policies solved the trade-off between extraction-related losses-i.e., investment distortions, marginal extraction cost, and military weakness-and the rent-seeking gains faced by the unitary government. 3 In this respect, our theory of endogenous extractive policies represents a natural complement to those contributions contrasting "extractive" and "inclusive" 3 Felice (2014) points at the extractive habits of Southern elite to explain the present-day divide. However, this mechanism is completely irrelevant to explain post-Unification economic outcomes (see section 5.4).
institutions (North et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) . Differently from them, we focus on the determinants of the conflict arising between a dominating geographic-and in general cultural-group and the rest of society given a certain level of the inclusiveness of the prevailing political institutions. The German government's opposition to the rescue packages demanded by Greece just before the 2011 European sovereign debt crisis ) and the extremely costly political tensions between the Basque Country and the central Spanish government (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) and between Northern Ireland and the UK (Besley and Mueller, 2012 ) constitute a case in point of this type of conflicts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the key facts about the political organization, economy, and tax system of the Italian regions over the 1811-1911 period to motivate the model. Section 3 illustrates the set up of the model and documents the robustness of its message to alternative assumptions. Section 4 states the model implications that are tested in section 5. Section 6 concludes. The appendix gathers both tables and figures.
2 Italy Before and After the Unification: A Primer
Next, we describe the political and economic contexts of the Italian regions over the 1811-1911 period, detailing at the same time the main innovations in tax policies.
The Era of Risorgimento
Italy emerged from the Congress of Vienna as a thoroughly designed strategic equilibrium among eight absolutists states: the Northwestern Kingdom of Sardinia ruled by the Pied- This institutional discontinuity hit the whole peninsula but was particularly relevant for the Southern population, who could finally see realized the reforms introduced during the French seizure, i.e., the privatization of one third of the clerical and common lands initially implemented in 1792 and the end of the Feudal system declared in 1806. The liberalization surge did not release the Italian peasants from their destitution but allowed a rising class of bourgeoisie to acquire part of the nester nobility's domains and prioritize market-oriented activities like arboriculture and sericulture over the classic subsistence farming, i.e., wheat (Pescosolido, 2011) . Both enterprises were capital intensive. Silk is obtained from the fibers extracted from the cocoons of the larvae of the mulberry silkworm dissolved in boiling water.
The fibers are spun through reels, which at the time were powered by watermills (Britannica, 2014) . The basic need of water favored the concentration of sericulture in the irrigated Po valley. Citrus and olive trees instead cannot tolerate a temperatures below 4 degree Celsius (Britannica, 2014) . This explains their almost exclusive presence in the South (Dimico et al., 2012) . Farming productivity quickly increased in both the sharecropping-based Northern farms and the Southern latifundia, which contrary to the conventional wisdom maintained a net technological primacy until the Unification (Federico, 2007) . Indeed, thanks to the training, job security, and credit line assured to its permanent employees, the "latifondisti" could invest in a setting characterized by a low level of conflict (Petrusewicz, 1996) .
After two centuries and half of economic decline (Malanima, 2011) , the Italian population started to grow again doubling over the 1800-1860 period whereas the GDP per capita after a first rise stagnated until the 1870 in the absence of any significant industrial revolution (Pescosolido, 2011) . 5 This pattern is clearly depicted in the left graph of figure 1 where we look at the regions that we will analyze in our empirical exercise-i.e., those outside the Kingdom of Sardinia and absorbed by the Kingdom of Italy in 1861-differentiating them between "North"-i.e., Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Tuscany, and Veneto, "Center"-i.e., Latium, Marches, and Umbria, and "South"-i.e., Abruzzi, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, and Sicily. The development of the pre-Unification Italian economy shows only limited regional differences with a slight primacy of the South and a general condition of backwardness. To elaborate on this last point, at Unification still 68 (only 3) percent of the active population was employed (worked exclusively) in the agricultural (industrial) sectors, and the production of iron (number of spindles) was less than 1 percent of the English one (Pescosolido, 2011) . The causes of this gap were the scarcity of coal and the paucity of human and real capital. 6 This second aspect manifested important regional dissimilarities.
While the Northern credit markets were slowly starting to become diversified with both small institutes-i.e., "casse di risparmio"-and medium sized commercial banks ready to serve the newborn industry, those of the South were still characterized by the plethora of micro-credit institutions appeared from the 15th century on, i.e., "Monti" (Felice, 2014) .
7
Equally underdeveloped but even more polarized was the educational structure. The share of illiterates aged over six in the total population ranged in 1861 from 53.7 percent in Lombardy to 88.6 percent in Sicily and was significantly higher in the South (see table 1 for the definition, sources, and statics of the variables we use, and table 2 for further details on the North-South divide). Obviously, in the absence of developed private markets, the asymmetry in human and real capital accumulation could only reflect disparities in the fiscal capacity and, in turn, the political objectives of the pre-unitary states (Dincecco et al., 2011) .
The 1848 revolutionary wave was by far the most violent. The patrioti tried to convince their rulers to participate in a war of independence against Austria led by King Carlo Alberto
5 The values of GDP-L for the pre-Unification South are inferred from the estimates of the GDP in Italy and in the Center-North developed by Malanima (2006 Malanima ( , 2011 but criticized from an ideological point of view (Daniele and Malanima, 2014) by Felice (2014) . We use them for descriptive purposes only. 6 In 1861 the total production of coal in Italy was 34,000 tonnes versus the 85 millions quarried in England, the 18.7 millions extracted in Germany, and the 9.4 millions mined in France (Pescosolido, 2011) . 7 Not surprisingly, over the 1861-1911 period, the deposits in "casse di risparmio" in 1861 lire per capita were significantly larger in the North-i.e., 64.11 versus 4.49 (SVIMEZ, 2011) , whereas the number of credit firms per thousands of people was significantly higher in the South, i.e., 0.04 versus 0.03 (Missiaia, 2012 figure 1 ). This was the most conspicuous among the direct taxes envisaged by the pre-unitary tax systems and, being based on the generated rent, varied across areas (Marongiu, 1995) . The larger costs of internal conflicts in the Two
Sicilies and the Papal State on the one hand and the subsidy allowed to Lombardy-Venetia by Vienna on the other hand justify the above-mentioned North's advantage in terms of human and real capital. Nevertheless, this lead was minimal and not determinant from a development point of view as also revealed by the average pre-unitary railway network, which was not significantly different between North and South-i.e., respectively 0.028 and 0.022 km per capita (Romani, 1982; SVIMEZ, 2011) , and by the tonnes of merchant navy per capita in 1860, which were higher in the South, i.e., 0.035 versus 0.027 (Pescosolido, 2011 A new unified Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed on March 17th, 1861.
Over and above the annexation of Veneto (1866) and Rome (1870), the desire of getting the Northern industry off the ground was the crucial objective of the first unitary governments, which were dominated up to the 1873 by the Piedmontese faction of the right wing party (see figure 2) . Expression of the rising liberal elite of the ex-Kingdom of Sardinia,
8
they foisted Piedmontese legislation and, in particular, its liberal policies on the rest of the country, favored the Northern industry in the allocation of public contracts, and increased the taxes levied on the annexed reigns to pay back the mounting public debt and finance new infrastructures: 9 albeit optimal from the policymakers' point of view, these policies soon produced unplanned and dramatic consequences for the whole peninsula.
The Piedmontese excise, one of the lowest in Europe, was immediately dictated to the whole state so that the regions part of the ex-Kingdom of Two Sicilies experienced a 80 percent fall in their customs. As a result, while the exports of silk exploded, those of olive oil and citrus soon crashed when cheaper substitutes arrived from the USA. The 1887 rise in customs did not change this trend since it affected mainly the North-based wheat farming and production of iron, which was boosting thanks to the public subsidization of the Genoese steamboat producers and the legal exclusion of Neapolitan firms from coastal navigation (Pescosolido, 2011) . A similar procurement policy was followed in the railways sector (see figure 2 ). To elaborate, the relative spending in 1861 lire per capita remained for a long time higher in the Northern part of Italy, which consequently ended up displaying a significantly larger network, i.e., 0.1 versus 0.06 Km per capita over the 1861 -1911 period (SVIMEZ, 2011 . Agrarian policies were similarly discriminatory: just 4 percent of the pre-First World 8 The opposing faction lumped together the annexed reigns' elites and championed through its leader, Marco Minghetti, the idea of a modern decentralized state concerned with each region's economic interests. 9 In 1861 the public debt amounted to the striking level of 40 percent of the total GDP (Pescosolido, 2011) .
War spending in land reclamation was allocated to the South (Iuzzolino et al., 2011) .
More important, the impressive infrastructural program supporting the Northern industry was financed out of highly unbalanced tax rises. In the first decade of the unified state, the average total revenues from land property taxes skyrocketed from 1.78 to 7.22-1861-lire per capita but the burden was borne chiefly by the South (Ministero delle Finanze, 1872). The 1864 tax reform indeed first established a sum to be raised-i.e., 125 millions, and then allocated it among nine districts resembling the pre-unitary states-i.e., Piedmont, Lombardy, Parma and Piacenza, Ex-Duchy of Modena, Tuscany, Ex-Papal State, Neapolitan provinces, Sicily, and Sardinia (Marongiu, 1995) . The most severe phase of these extractive policies came to an end with the achievement of the balanced budget in 1876, but by then the divergence of the two economies was irreversible (Nitti, 1905) . By the end of the 19th century, the steel, clothing, and mechanical industries were wiped out from the South, while a competitive manufacturing and heavy equipment industry was established in the North (see table 2 and Iuzzolino et al., [2011] ). Furthermore, the economic impoverishment had deteriorated the government-citizenry relationship and the cooperation in the South. On the one hand, a sizable part of the population experienced the Unification as an undue occupation by the Piedmontese armies. This unchained a ferocious series of crashes, which goes under the name of "brigandage." Between 1861 and 1864, this civil war brought around 20,000 Southern victims, imposed a de facto militarization of the area, 11 and opened the way to the massive emigration from the countryside (Felice, 2014) . Accordingly, the 1890s ratio of gross emigration to total population accelerated in the South surpassing by far the one in the Center-North (Iuzzolino et al., 2011) . On the other hand, the population started to display an increasingly lower culture of cooperation as documented by the fall of the turnout rate (see the two rightmost graphs in figure 3 ), which constitutes an outcomes-based measure of social capital (Guiso and Pinotti, 2013) .
Contrary to the conclusions reached by a long literature on permanent institutions (Guiso et al., 2014) , the 1911 snapshot and not the 1861 one should be considered an outlier. To see this, the leftmost graph in figure 3 compares the cumulated discounted numbers of years of activity over the 1000-1600 period of Cistercian and Franciscan houses in the North and South of Italy. Boranbay and Guerriero (2013) document that in the Middle Ages these monks met the population's demand for insurance against consumption shocks in exchange for the acceptance of a culture of cooperation so that, at the European regional level, there is a strong correlation between their expansion and present-day self-reported norms of respect and trust. Thus, a glance to figure 3 suggests that post-Unification policies seem to be also a powerful account of the present-day divide in culture across Italian regions.
Later on, the fascist regime's aversion to migration and its rush to arming managed through a series of investments in the Northern heavy industry have stretched even more the North-South divide, which has been only scratched by the 1960s economic booms and state aids.
12 Despite these more recent events however, it should be clear at this point that the present-day North-South gap opened because of the extractive-especially taxation-policies implemented by the Kingdom of Italy's government in the aftermath of the Unification.
Theory
Consider a territory divided in two regions r ∈ {N, S} each inhabited by a mass one of equal citizens consuming a public good g r and a private good, whose demand and supply are D r and X r . Building on section 2, the N region is the Kingdom of Sardinia, whereas S can be seen as any of the other regions part of the Kingdom of Italy. Each citizenry has full property rights on the X r production technology, which is linear in the region-specific technological parameter A r > 0 and her investment in a culture of cooperation C r , i.e., X r = A r C r . This assumption is consistent with the huge evidence according to which a culture of cooperation is pivotal to curb transaction costs, expand anonymous market exchange, and facilitate the division of labor (Tabellini, 2010; Guerriero, 2014) . In terms of our historical case, X r is the product of a farming technology requiring an increasingly larger quantity of intermediate inputs, a higher division of labor, and a more sophisticated technology, i.e., silk or citrus.
12 Iuzzolino et al. (2011) emphasize these channels, which are fully consistent with our model.
At time zero, the citizenry of region r fixes a level of culture to instill in its members through a linear cultural accumulation technology (see Boranbay and Guerriero, [2013] ).
This assumption incorporates into the model the key insights of evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992) and Malthusian growth theories (Clark and Hamilton, 2006) : group-specific cultural values result from a process that instills, via natural selection or cross-punishment, norms maximizing the fitness of the group's members. Thus, a citizenry expecting higher returns from cooperation ends up showing a stronger C r . At time one and under autarky (political union), region r (N ) elite, who has mass zero, selects the rate(s) t r (t U N and t U S ) at which the production of the private good is then taxed. At time two and under autarky (political union), a share α < 1 (α in the North and α U < α in the South) of the regional revenues is used by the elite (Northern elite) to produce the regionspecific public good g r , whereas the remainder winds up in region r (N ) elite's pocket. The public good production function is linear, and each tax rate maximizes the elite's rents plus the citizenry's welfare net of linear tax-collection costs. Thus, α U < α implies that under political union the Northern elite attaches a higher weight on the welfare of the citizenry of her own region than on the welfare of the Southern citizenry or, similarly, that α U increases with the political relevance of the South for the Northern elite. This set up captures the post-Unification evolution of political institutions. At time three, each citizenry obtains a concave utility from consuming the untaxed output and the region-specific public good.
Autarky
Under autarky, an r citizenry selects a C r maximizing the objective function
where hats label equilibrium quantities,t r ≡ 1 −t r (1 − αγ), and γ gages the citizenry's relative preference for g r vis-a-vis D r . 13 We maintain that αγ > 1 so that region N (S) citizenry prefers public to private good production because of, for instance, the economic development achievable only through new infrastructures as railways (harbor maintenance and land reclamation). The unique and global equilibrium levels of culture and consumption 13 The gist of the model will be similar should the citizenry's subutility from consumption be Cobb-Douglas.
areĈ r =t r
Ar 4 andD r = 1 −t r A rĈr so that the citizenry's and social welfare is V r =t r Ar 4
.
Taking into account the citizenry's choice, an r elite selects a tax policy maximizing
where the marginal tax-collection cost is such that K > max 1 − α,
. This last assumption is consistent with the fact that, before the warfare that lead to the unified state, the taxation power of the Italian reigns was limited (Dincecco et al., 2011) . The unique and global solution to problem (2) ist r = 1 2Ar(K+α−1)
, which falls with K and decreases with A r since at the margin the taxation gains in terms of social welfare equal 1−αγ whereas the taxation costs in terms of collection expenses net of rents are increasing in the technological efficiency. Finally,t r has an uncertain link with α, which both depresses the elite's rents and augments the incentive to invest via a higher payoff from public good consumption. The equilibrium levels of culture and welfare equal
, which obviously rises with A r , α, and γ and decreases with K that can be seen as inverse measure of the feasibility of public good production. Finally, tax revenuest r A rĈr = fall with A r , decrease (increase) with K (γ) being the product of two functions falling (rising) with K (γ), and have an uncertain relationship with α when A r is sufficiently small. As discussed in section 2, this is the scenario fitting the most the economy object of our empirical exercise.
Political Union
Building on the insights of section 2, we maintain that under political union the Northern elite: 1. extracts all the rents and devotes a share of the Southern tax revenues to public good production lower than that committed by the Southern elite under autarky because of its political primacy; 2. bears lower marginal tax-collection costs in the South
because of the militarization of the area; 3. faces a technological constraint in producing g S -i.e., γ U < γ so that α U γ U < 1-because of the differences between the public goods most conducive to development in each region, e.g., railways and harbor maintenance (Pescosolido, 2011) . Since the regional tax revenues not appropriated by the Northern elite produce the region-specific public goods, the citizenry's problem is the same as in autarky so thatĈ
As a consequence,t
since there is no trade between regions. Tax revenues in the Southt
2 decrease with K and increase with both γ U and A S . This last comparative statics is different with respect the autarchy equilibrium because now rent-extraction incentives are stronger than marginal tax-collection costs and thus an increase in technological efficiency and thus investment calls for more taxation. Finally, the tax revenues raised in the South falls with α U (are higher than under autarky) whenever A S is sufficiently small (and γ U is not too different from γ).
Intuitively, a fall in the South's political relevance fosters the rent-seeking motives of the Northern elite but curbs at the same time the Southern population's incentive to invest. If technological efficiency is limited, the first effect must prevail. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium of the endogenous taxation game under the two regimes:
Proposition 1: Under autarky (political union), the tax revenues raised in the South fall (rise) with technological efficiency A S , decrease with the marginal tax-collection cost K (K U ), and increase with the public good quality γ. Whenever A S is sufficiently small (and γ U is not too different from γ), they fall with the political relevance of the South for the Northern elite α U (are higher under political union than under autarky).
14 Next, we take stock of the results obtained so far to analyze the impact on culture and economic outcomes of an exogenous shock turning autarky into a political union.
The Rise of the North-South Divide
Under political union, cultural accumulation and welfareĈ
increase with both the marginal tax-collection cost K U and the South's political relevance for the Northern elite α U , which in turn curb extraction and so investment distortion. The mix 14 If −∆K < 0, −∆α < 0, and −∆γ < 0 capture the impact of the Unification,t
, which is the case since α U γ U < 1 and
2 , which is true for ∆γ → 0.
of lower marginal tax-collection costs and inefficient public good provision thus implies that Unification can depress both cultural investment and social welfare in the South provided that K U falls below
In terms of our historical experiment, given a level of K U , regions to which a relatively high α U is assigned will gain from Unification, whereas those for which α U tends to 0 will irreparably lose. The following proposition restates this series of remarks:
Proposition 2: Under political union, both cultureĈ U S and social welfare V U S in the South rise with the marginal tax-collection cost K U and the political relevance α U , and they can be lower than the corresponding levels under autocracy for K U and α U sufficiently small.
Our model provides a theory of endogenous extractive policies in a political or economic union dominated by one of its components. One key extension to our analysis is to endogenize the parameter α in order to consider the passage towards more democratic political processes giving the citizenry the chance of constraining the elite's choices (North et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Boranbay and Guerriero, 2013) . Similarly, the elite might be induced to extract less surplus from the South if worried that the Southern citizenry could opt out of the modern sector producing X S and specialize in a sector demanding no investments. We leave the first robustness to future research being less related to the case analyzed in our empirical exercise, but we study the second one in the following.
General Equilibrium Disincentives to Extraction
The Southern citizenry can consume an alternative good T S -i.e., wheat-produced through a "traditional" technology, which is linear in the productivity parameter N S with √ N S <
, i.e., T S = N S . Being the traditional sector technology independent of investment activities, the indirect utility of citizenry S producing T S equals
is the tax rate levied on the traditional good in the South andτ
so that the Southern citizenry will select the traditional sector whenever α 
16 The Northern elite prefers to tax
as the political relevance of the South was at least α U to levy taxes on a more productive activity. The Northern elite will face a similar incentive should the most taxed citizenry have the chance of selling some of its production to the other group. In this case, extraction is curbed by the prospect of cheap imports. Since regional trades were limited over our sample (Iuzzolino et al., 2011) , we leave this extension to the basic setup to future research.
Empirical Implications
Our model produces two sets of implications regarding the thirteen regions outside the Kingdom of Sardinia and completely annexed by the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. 17 The first one concerns the differences between the pre and post-Unification tax policies. The second one deals with the post-Unification distortions in cultural accumulation and outcomes produced by the higher state capacity of the unified state and the lower weight on the South's welfare put by the central authority. These implications can be restated as testable predictions as:
Predictions: Pre-Unification regional tax revenues will fall with both technological efficiency and the marginal tax-collection cost but will be independent of the region's political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite. Post-Unification tax revenues instead will increase with technological efficiency and decrease with the marginal tax-collection cost and the region's political relevance. Finally, post-Unification distortions in outcomes and culture will be higher the lower are the marginal tax-collection cost and the region's political relevance.
Evidence
To test our predictions we need, first and foremost, meaningful proxies for the revenues from the taxes on the most relevant production activities in our sample, the efficiency of the related technologies, the cost of raising these taxes for each reign's government and for the unified state, and each region's political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite.
, which is the case under our restriction on N S , i.e., if
. 17 They are Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia, Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzi, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, and Sicily. Piedmont, Liguria, and Sardinia were part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whereas Trentino-Alto Adige (Friuli-Venezia Giulia) was annexed (in its entirety) to the Kingdom of Italy in 1919 (1918 even if Friuli was already part of it from 1866). Finally, Molise was separated from Abruzzi in 1963.
Measuring Taxation and Its Determinants
Consistent with the extant literature on the North-South divide (Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2013) , we base our analysis on 10-year benchmarks; moreover, we focus on the period, before and after 1861, over which tax rates remained region-specific and our regions kept a stable political and territorial identity, i.e., 1801 -1911 (Galasso, 2011 . 18 We employ present-day regional boundaries but our results are similar when we switch to the historical ones.
Since regional tax rates are unavailable, we focus on the revenues raised through the land property tax-i.e., "imposta sul valore fondiario"-in 1861 lire per capita, Land-Taxes, which represented the great part of total revenues from direct taxes-i.e., 43 percent over our sample-and hit the average profitability from land property. Before Unification, Land-Taxes ranges from zero in the Papal State to 3.26 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This pattern conceals a huge variation in tax rates and income, which persisted after the Unification.
To show that our results are not driven by unobserved differences in land availability and suitability, we document in the Internet Appendix that they remain similar if we divide total revenues by the arable area in square kilometer collected from SVIMEZ (2011) or control for the land quality estimated by the Atlas of the Biosphere interacted with time effects.
To gage the efficiency of the most-widespread farming activities, we look at the geographic determinants of the technologies producing silk, citrus, olives, and wheat. While the first three represent the most profitable activities discussed in the basic model, the last one embodies the traditional sector we analyze in section 3.4. Building on section 2, we use as proxy for the efficiency of the sericulture technology the normalized first principal component extracted from the share of the region's area covered by large lakes and rivers and the average growing season precipitation in the previous decade in ml, Sericulture.
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Turning to the efficiency of wheat (arboriculture) breeding, we consider the normalized first principal component extracted from the land suitability(ies) for wheat (citrus and olive trees) and the average growing season precipitation in the previous decade in ml (temperature in these technologies weakly grows with the average land suitability, precipitation, and temperature (Britannica, 2014) , but only the first and second (first and third) geographic traits are positively correlated with Wheat (Arboriculture). To cross validate our proxies, first we document their high correlation with the production of each item between 1871 and 1911, and then we show that our conclusions are similar when we use either one of the land suitabilities for citrus and olive trees to evaluate each technology (see the Internet appendix).
Turning to the marginal tax-collection costs, we follow Dincecco et al. (2011) and elect as a proxy the military personnel per 1000 citizens, Army. A vast body of research has shown that two key determinants of a state capacity to raise revenue are the risk of external or internal conflicts and the degree of political instability (Besley and Persson, 2009 ). Accordingly, higher levels of Army should correspond to a lower marginal tax-collection cost (Dincecco et al., 2011) . Our results will be similar should we consider instead the share of the previous decade in which the state participated in external wars (see the Internet appendix). 
Endogenous Taxation
Building on our model, we estimate by OLS tax policy equations of the following type
where LT r,t is Land-Taxes in region r and year t, the vector A r,t gathers Sericulture, Wheat, and Arboriculture, S r,t labels Army, P r,t indicates Distance-to-Enemies, whereas α r account for time-independent differences across regions like unobserved geography shaping the efficiency of the different farming technologies. Considering the squared terms into equation (4) greatly increases the fit of the model and allows us to capture relevant nonlinearities in the data, which are plausible given the functional forms of the equilibrium tax revenues (see section 3.1). The key implications to be tested are that β 0 is negative in the pre-Unification sample and positive otherwise, γ 0 > 0 since S r,t is an inverse measure of tax-collection costs, and δ 0 is insignificant (positive and significant) in the pre(post)-Unification sample.
In judging the adequacy of the empirical strategy, it is worth to discuss the possible endogeneity of the regressors in equation (4). First, the controls encapsulated in A r,t are clearly exogenous since they are all driven by either climate shocks or features of the region's terrain independent of human effort. Second, Distance-to-Enemies was shaped by events outside the control of the Italian elites as the Vienna Congress, the Spring of Nations, the French expansion in Tunisia, and the German realpolitik. Furthermore, since δ 0 is identified by the time variation in Distance-to-Enemies, it cannot simply capture the distance from international markets. Similarly, as stressed in section 2, Army was mainly driven by the boundary lines designed by the Vienna Congress and the resulting internal and external dangers to the survival of each state (Galasso, 2011) . Finally, the correlation between Army and Distance-to-Enemies is limited-i.e., -27 (1) percent in the pre(post)-Unification sample.
This excludes that the results could simply be driven by multicollinearity among the controls.
Columns (1) to (3) of table 3 display the estimates for three alternative specifications, the first excluding both Army and Distance-to-Enemies, the second excluding only Distance-toEnemies, and the third one including all controls. Columns (4) to (6) of table 3 have the same structure but are based on the post-Unification sample. To control for arbitrary correlation within groups we allow for clustering by region. For the most part, the results are consistent with the model predictions, and the implied effects are large. In particular, the estimates reveal a negative and significant relationship between regional tax revenues and proxies for efficiency of sericulture and arboriculture in the pre-Unification sample, whereas the two variables lose significance in the post-Unification sample. Furthermore, the more efficient is the outside option represented by the subsistence wheat breeding, the weaker was the Piedmontese incentive to curb extraction after 1861. Distance-to-Enemies instead is irrelevant to explain pre-Unification regional taxation but represents the strongest predictor of post-Unification tax policies. In particular, a one-standard-deviation rise in the distance from the relevant Kingdom of Sardinia's enemies-i.e., 256 km-is associated with a 0.7-standard-deviation increase in Land-Taxes, 3.57 lire per capita. Finally, Army is never significant. This lack of statistical significance could be simply driven by the preferences of the elite to resort to indirect taxes (Dincecco et al., 2011) . All in all, it is fair to summarize our results stating that pre-Unification policies were mainly driven by efficiency concerns, whereas post-Unification taxation was the product of a rational extraction process by the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite whose impact on the other regions we measure as follows.
The Rise of the North-South Divide
Ignoring nonlinearities, 21 we estimate performance equations of the type Y r,t = α r + γ 2 S r,t + δ 2 P r,t + ζD r,t + ν r,t ,
where Y r,t is the ratio of one among seven development indicators to its 1861 value, i.e., GDP, Turnout, Illiterates, VA F, VA T, VA C, VA M (see table 1) . 22 These indicators 21 The message of our analysis will be the same should we add to the specification S 2 r,t , P 2 r,t , and LT D 2 r,t . 22 The message of the empirical exercise is similar when we look at the gross tradable annual farming production are respectively the income in 1861 lire per capita, the electoral turnout, the share of the population aged over six that was illiterate, and the value added in the foodstuff sector, in the textiles sector, in the clothing sector, and in the manufacturing sector all expressed in millions of 1861 lire. Turnout (Illiterates) is positively (negatively) correlated to a stronger culture of cooperation (human capital) (Guiso and Pinotti, 2013) .
23 When needed, we imputed a missing observation with the following data point: this approximation strategy does not affect the gist of our empirical results. Indeed, we document that our results will be very similar should we focus on the subsample 1871-1911 for which we observe almost all the variables (see the Internet appendix). 24 α r control for time-independent differences across regions like the inclusiveness of the political institutions prevailing before Unification.
D r,t is the difference between the observed Land-Taxes and the land property tax revenues per capita forecasted using the specification illustrated in column (1) of table 3, LTD.
LTD
assumes larger values when tax distortions are wider and incorporates unobserved shifters of the tax-collection cost and of the regional political relevance. A caveat to our approach can be that the Unification dramatically changed the structures of the regional economies making our positive taxation model inadequate for the 1861-1911 sample. Yet, over this period, the percentage of the active population employed in the industrial sectors in the North (Center-South) raised (felt) by only two (one) percent-i.e., from 12 to 14 (13 to 12), and the gist of our results is the same should we consider time dummies (see the Internet appendix). These control for price shocks, epidemics, and changes in policies and technology affecting the whole country. We expect that the estimates of γ 2 , δ 2 , and ζ are all significant and negative (positive when the dependent variable is Illiterates).
A glance to figures 1, 2, and 3 confirms the model predictions. Figure 1 shows the opposite evolutions of the level of income per capita and land property taxes in post-Unification Italy:
the regions less politically relevant for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite experienced the most hindering tax policies and the weakest growth in well-being, whereas the opposite is true per employee, the life expectancy in years, the average height of conscripted workers, the above-described value added per capita, and the value added for the mining and wood sectors (see the Internet appendix). 23 Felice and Vasta (2012) provide a different but less reliable proxy for culture (Daniele and Malanima, 2014) . 24 Of course, in this case, we define the proxies for Y r,t as the ratio of each indicator to its 1871 value. 25 We don't use either the specification reported in column (2) or that illustrated in column (3) of table 3 since post-Unification values of S r,t and P r,t should be irrelevant in the counterfactual autarky regime. 2.34-is associated with an almost 11 percent fall in income per capita, a 2.6 percent decrease in the turnout, and a slightly higher than 6 percent rise in the share of population aged over six that were illiterates with respect to their 1861 levels (see columns (1) to (3) of panel C).
Similarly, a one-standard-deviation rise in Distance-to-Enemies-i.e., 256 km-is associated with a 7.7 percent fall in GDP, whereas a one-standard-deviation increase in LTD-i.e., 5.2-implies a 5.8 percent fall in GDP and a 0.5 percent rise in Illiterates (see panel C).
Identifying Causal Relationships
The negative link between tax distortions and welfare discussed in the previous section is consistent with the testable predictions produced by our model. Yet, this correlation could also be explained by omitted variables. We pursue a two-step strategy to assess whether the correlations documented so far are indeed causal. First we control for relevant observable factors, and then we use selection on observables to assess the bias from unobservables.
Controlling for Observables
We consider four observables possibly confounding the effect of tax distortions on economic outcomes. First, we incorporate the ratio of estimated regional wage based on non tradable goods to the Italian average, Wages (Felice and Vasta, 2012) . This should exclude that either the post-Unification selection of the conversion rates between regional currencies and the lire or the wage rigidities in the South drive our results. Second, to contrast our model with the idea that fragmented land ownership and income created an extractive bourgeoisie class in the South (Felice, 2014) , we include into the analysis the Gini coefficient, , 2011) . Along the same line, we experimented with using Illiterates as a control variable rather than as a dependent variable, and we obtained qualitatively similar estimates.
Third, to take care of the technological drivers of the Industrial Revolution in Italy, we look at the horsepower units of hydroelectric and water power production in millions of 1861 lire, HW-Power (Missiaia, 2012) . Water represented the single and most important energy endowment in the post-Unification period and became increasingly relevant for the rising textile, clothing, and manufacturing sectors (Missiaia, 2012) . Fourth, we tackle the possibility that demographic differences captured by the population per square kilometer-i.e.,
Population-D-determine outcomes by shaping the incidence of land property taxes.
The estimates listed in panels A to D of table 5 reveal that our results remain almost intact once we consider alternative explanations of the North-South divide. Consistent with the historical analysis of section 2, while exchange rate policies and the fragmentation of economic power do not make an economically relevant dent in explaining the post-Unification divergence in the welfare of the two blocks, both the initial energy endowment and the population density help shed new light on the 1861-1911 events.
Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables
Despite our attempts to control for relevant observables, our estimates may still be biased by unobservable factors correlated with technological efficiency, state capacity, and the political relevance of each region for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite. Next, we use selection on observables to assess the potential bias from unobservables. We build on Altonji et al. (2005) who provide an index gaging how much stronger selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, must be to explain away the full estimated effect.
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To see how the index is calculated in table 6, consider two regressions: one with a restricted set of control variables and one with a full set of controls. Denote the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest from the first regression γ R , where R stands for "restricted," and the estimated coefficient from the second regression γ F , where F stands for "full." Then, the index equals the absolute value of the ratio γ F /(γ R − γ F ). The intuition 26 We use the version developed by Bellows and Miguel (2009) for possibly endogenous continuous variables.
behind the formula is as follows. First, consider why the ratio is decreasing in (γ
The smaller is the absolute value of the difference between γ R and γ F , the less the estimate is affected by selection on observables, and the stronger selection on unobservables needs to be to explain away the entire effect. Next, note that the larger the absolute value of γ F is, the greater is the effect that needs to be explained away by selection on unobservables, and thus the higher is the ratio. We focus on the variables testing the key model predictions.
In particular, we look at the proxies for technological efficiency in the endogenous taxation model run on the pre-Unification sample (see column (1)), the measures of state capacity and the political relevance in the endogenous taxation model run on the post-Unification sample (see column (2)), and at Army, Distance-to-Enemies, and LTD in the performance equations (see columns (3) to (9)). These are also the regressors whose coefficients are more statistically and economically significant in tables 3 to 5. The covariates added to the full set are those listed in the last three rows of table 6. The median and the average of the indexes in columns (1) and (2) (columns (3) to (9)) are respectively 4. 36 and 11.35 (3.75 and 4.49) .
Thus, to attribute the entire OLS estimates to selection effects, selection on unobservables would have to be on average 7 times greater than selection on observables. In our view, these results make it quite unlikely that our estimates are simply driven by unobservables.
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Conclusions
One of the most puzzling issues in economics is the huge divide between the North and South of Italy despite more than 150 years of common formal institutions. We document that the opening of the present-day gap in culture and economic outcomes is the consequence of the region-specific tax policies selected between 1861 and 1911 by the elite of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which annexed the rest of Italy in 1861. Regional pre-Unification tax revenues indeed are mainly explained by the contemporaneous farming productivity but not by the region's political relevance for the Kingdom of Sardinia's elite, whereas the opposite is true for the post-Unification period. Moreover, tax distortions, tax-collection costs, and each region's political relevance significantly shaped the increasing post-Unification differences in 27 We will reach a qualitatively similar conclusion should we consider as extra control in the full set of covariates one among Gini, HW-Power, and Population-D instead of the variable Wages.
income per capita, electoral turnout, and human capital between the North and the South.
We measure tax distortions with the difference between the tax revenues observed in the region and those that would have prevailed without Unification according to the two-region, two-social class model that we construct to inform our empirical exercise. To determine whether the correlations we document are, in fact, causal, we follow a two-step strategy.
First, we control not only for fixed region effects, but also for other relevant observable factors, like wages, income inequality, energy endowment, and population density. Including these controls has little effect on our results. Second, we use insights from Altonji et al. (2005) to evaluate how much greater the influence of unobservables would need to be, relative to observables, to completely explain away the relationships we uncover in the data. We find that this influence would have to be on average 7 times greater than that of observable factors.
Of course, our results characterize the crack of the dawn of the North-South divide and other more recent factors may have aggravated the disparities arose before the First World War (Iuzzolino et al., 2011) . Accordingly, evaluating more recent mechanisms that have affected the diverging performances of the two blocks is an important avenue for further research. Similarly, it is worth the effort applying our framework to understand the deep conflicts that are shaking the European Union nowadays (see also Malanima (2006 Malanima ( , 2011 Felice and Vasta (2012) .
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VA W-L represent respectively the gross saleable annual production per employee, the life expectancy in years, the average height of conscripted workers, the value added in the foodstuff, textiles, clothing, and manufacturing sector in millions of 1861 lire per capita, and the value added in the mining and wood sector in millions of 1861 lire. 2.
*, **, and *** denote a significant difference between the means in the North and South samples at respectively the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % based on a two-sample t-test with unequal variances. The North (South) sample includes Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Tuscany (Abruzzi, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania), and Veneto (Sicily). Wheat-P Citrus-P Olive-P Notes:
1. Silk-P (Wheat-P) represents the production of silk (wheat) in kg (hectoliters). Citrus-Sales (Olive-Sales) is the production of citrus (olives) in hundreds (hectoliters). All these variables are collected for the years 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911 from Direzione Generale della Statistica e Lavoro (1886, 1890, 1900, 1911) . Thus, each correlation is calculated for a sample of 65 observations. *** denotes significant at the 1 % confidence level; **, 5 %; *, 10 %. 3.
All specifications include a constant term. *** denotes significant at the 1 % confidence level; **, 5 %; *, 10 %. 3.
All specifications include a constant term. 
